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The goal of this paper is to provide stylized facts on recovery from economic downturns 
and to evaluate the role of macroeconomic policies in promoting recovery. In particular, 
we examine gross domestic product (GDP) recessions and financial downturns (credit 
contractions and stock price declines) using data from 21 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) economies and 21 developing Asian economies. 
We find, in general, recovery from a GDP recession in Asian economies is somewhat 
slower than in OECD economies. However, recovery from a financial downturn is not 
much different between Asian and OECD economies. We also find OECD economies 
have  been  more  active  and  effective  in  using  counter-cyclical  policies  than  Asian 
economies in the face of GDP recessions and financial downturns. Recent evidence, 
however, suggests Asian economies may have better success in the current global crisis.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  stylized  facts  on  the  process  of  recovery  from 
economic downturns and to evaluate the role of counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies 
in  promoting  recovery.  In  our  previous  research  (Hong  et  al.,  2009),  we  examined 
historical crisis episodes in Asia and found that economic downturns are more frequent, 
longer-lasting,  and  more  severe  in  developing  Asian  economies  than  in  advanced 
economies.  This  project  extends  our  previous  research  and  provides  analysis  on 
recoveries  from  a  downturn  in  Asia.  This  project  is  also  related  to  the  International 
Monetary  Fund’s  (IMF)  World  Economic  Outlook  April  2009  (WEO 2009),  which 
addresses the issue of crisis and recovery, and provides empirical analysis using data 
from  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  economies. 
This  project  follows  the  methodology  of  WEO  2009  and  examines  gross  domestic 
product (GDP) recessions, credit contractions, and stock price declines using data from 
the 21 developing Asian economies that were examined in Hong et al. (2009). Through 
this research, we hope to provide a more complete picture of economic downturns and 
recoveries in Asia.  
 
We carry out various statistical analyses—including linear regression, survival analysis, 
and  probit  estimation—for  both  GDP  recessions  and  financial  downturns.  First,  the 
estimation  results  show  that,  in  general,  recovery  from  a  GDP  recession  in  Asian 
economies is somewhat slower than in OECD economies. However, when outliers are 
excluded, the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, recovery from a financial 
downturn  is  not  particularly  slower  in  Asia  than  in  the  OECD.  Second,  Asia  exhibits 
greater volatility over the course of a downturn and recovery.  Third, fiscal policy has 
been strongly counter-cyclical for GDP recessions in both the OECD and developing 
Asia.  Monetary  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  counter-cyclical  only  in  OECD 
recessions. During credit contractions,  monetary policy becomes expansionary in  the 
OECD and developing Asia alike. Fourth, while details differ depending on the variable 
and  estimation  method  used,  expansionary  macroeconomic  policies  tend  to  promote 
recovery. The effect of counter-cyclical policies is more evident in the OECD than in Asia. 
For Asian economies, policy changes in foreign countries, particularly Japan, also seem 
to be important for recovery. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes data sets and variables we use in 
the paper, including definitions of economic downturns and recovery. Section III provides 
results  from  our  empirical  analysis.  In  section  IV,  we  provide  a  summary  of  policy 
responses and the recovery process during the recent global crisis. Section V concludes 
the paper. 
 
2.   Data and Variables  
 
2.1   Data 
 
Our sample consists of 21 developing Asian economies and 21 industrialized economies. 
The  developing  Asian  economies  include  the  10  members  of  the  Association  of  
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Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN);
1 Bangladesh;  People’s  Republic  of  China  (PRC); 
Hong  Kong,  China;  India;  Kazakhstan;  Republic  of  Korea  (Korea);  Kyrgyz  Republic; 
Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Sri Lanka; and Uzbekistan. We exclude the Middle East 
and  countries  with  low  data  availability.  The  industrialized  economies  refer  to  21 
members of the OECD, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany,  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US). 
The sample period is from 1961 to 2009. We use unbalanced panel data to utilize as 
many observations as possible. 
Following  Claessens  et  al.  (2008)  and  Hong  et  al.  (2009),  we  consider  both  GDP 
recessions  and  financial  downturns.  In  severe  economic  crises,  including  the  most 
recent one in the US, contractions in GDP are often accompanied by contractions in 
financial activities. For a full analysis of recovery from a severe crisis, one would need to 
examine both the real sector and the financial sector. We use real GDP to represent the 
real  sector,  while  using  domestic  credit  and  stock  prices  for  the  financial  sector. 
Domestic credit and stock prices are deflated using the consumer price index (CPI).  
Our GDP variable is annual real GDP from International Financial Statistics (IFS), World 
Development Indicators (WDI), and the OECD. While most previous studies on crisis 
and  recovery  focus  on  developed  economies  where  quarterly  data  are  available 
(Claessens et al., 2008; WEO, 2009), this paper examines developing Asian economies 
and developed economies at the same time. The quarterly GDP series for developing 
economies  provided  in  IFS  are  very  limited  and  not  seasonally  adjusted,  which 
necessitates the use of annual data for these economies. We maintain data consistency 
by using annual GDP for both developing and developed economies. In contrast to GDP, 
domestic credit and stock prices are widely available quarterly. Also, financial downturns 
often involve sharp changes in bank credit and stock prices, which may not be effectively 
captured in the annual data. For these reasons, we follow previous studies and use a 
quarterly series of domestic credit and stock prices. When we need to aggregate data 
with different frequencies, we expand annual data such that four quarters in a year have 
the same value. For those variables that are available both quarterly and annually, we 
simply  choose  the  appropriate  frequency.  For  example,  CPI  is  used  at  the  annual 
frequency when combined with GDP data and at the quarterly frequency when combined 
with domestic credit and stock price data. 
For measures of policy responses, we consider changes in the call interest rate and 
changes in government consumption expenditure. WEO 2009 uses primary balance in 
addition to these variables as an alternative measure of fiscal policy. We do not follow 
this approach because fiscal variables other than government consumption have very 
low data availability, especially among developing Asian economies.
2 Both the call rate 
                                                  
1  ASEAN includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao 
PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
2  Also, in international government finance data, the accounting framework recently has changed from 
cash basis to accrual basis, as recommended by the IMF’s Government Finance Manual 2001. The 
newly constructed government finance data are available only from 1990 onward, while the old series 
are available only up to 2001. The two series are not consistent with each other and thus cannot be 
combined.  
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and government consumption were obtained from IFS and the OECD. The call rate is 
adjusted  for  inflation,  where  inflation  is  defined  as  year-on-year  growth  in  the  CPI, 
available both quarterly and annually. On the other hand, real government consumption 
expenditure,  being  a  part  of  GDP  accounts,  is  available  only  annually  for  most 
developing economies. In order to maintain consistency across countries, we use  an 
annual series of government consumption for all countries in our sample. More specific 
definitions of monetary and fiscal policy will be provided below. 
2.2   Definitions of Recession (Downturn) and Recovery 
 
For GDP, domestic credit, and stock prices, we first date peaks and troughs in each 
series based on the concept of classical business cycles, which was formalized by Burns 
and Mitchell (1946) and later implemented in an algorithm by Bry and Boschan (1971), 
and Harding and Pagan (2002). According to Harding and Pagan’s rule, period t in a 
quarterly series x is defined as a trough if xt < xt+k, for k = –1, –2, 1, 2; and a peak if xt > 
xt+k, for k = –1, –2, 1, 2. Given peaks and troughs, a recession or a downturn is naturally 
defined as the period immediately after a peak to the following trough. A censoring rule 
is additionally applied to ensure that each cycle and each of its phases has a minimum 
duration.  Harding  and  Pagan  recommend  setting  the  minimum  duration  for  a  single 
phase at 2 quarters and the minimum duration for a complete cycle at 5 quarters. When 
applied to an annual series, Harding and Pagan’s rule will imply that period t should be 
defined as a trough if xt < xt+k, for k = –1 and 1, and a peak if xt > xt+k, for k =  –1 and 1. 
In other words, any period (year) of negative growth can be regarded as a recession (or 
downturn). Watson (1994) uses the same reasoning in his analysis of annual data. We 
apply this rule to our annual real GDP series.
3 The duration is simply given by the length 
(number of years) of a recession, while the amplitude measures the peak-to-trough fall in 
the logarithmic value of the series.  
 
Recovery is defined in this article by two measures: (i) the length of time until recovery to 
previous peak and (ii) the growth rate during the first year of recover y. The first one 
measures how long a series, after hitting a trough, remains below the previous peak. 
The second one measures the growth rate of a series during the  1-year period following 
a trough. Once again, this is the same definition used by WEO 2009. Figure 1 illustrates 
an example where the series reaches a peak in period t and a trough in period t+2. The 
duration of the downturn is thus 2 and the amplitude given by ab. The time until recovery 
to previous peak is 1 (or t+3 minus t+2) and the growth in the first year after the trough is 
ab.  
2.3   Definitions of Policy Responses 
 
One  difficulty  in  measuring  policy  responses  is  distinguishing  between  discretionary 
changes  in  policies  and  the  components  of  policies  that  automatically  respond  to 
economic  fluctuations.  Government  spending,  for  example,  is  largely  restricted  by 
government revenue, which in turn is determined by economic activity. Consequently, 
government spending tends to decrease during recessions even when the government 
                                                  
3  It is clear that we do not need a separate censoring rule for annual series, because a complete cycle 
(from peak to peak) will always take at least 2 years, which is greater than 5 quarters.  
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takes  on  an  expansionary  stance  by  running  deficits.  In  order  to  properly  evaluate 
discretionary  policy  responses  by  the  government,  one  needs  to  control  for  the 
automatic  positive  correlation  between  government  consumption  and  GDP  that  may 
originate  from  the  income  elasticity  of  tax  revenue.  In  this  paper,  we  address  this 
problem by making cyclical adjustments for policy variables using a simple regression 
framework. More specifically, to cyclically adjust government consumption, we estimate 
the  following  equation  separately  for  both  the  developed  economy  group  and  the 
developing economy group, using a panel estimation technique: 
government consumption gapi,t = β0 + β1*GDP gapi,t + ei,t,                         (1) 
where government consumption gap and GDP gap are residuals from Hodrick–Prescott 
filtering of log(government consumption expenditure) and log(GDP), respectively.
4 This 
is  slightly  different  from  the  specification  used  in  WEO  2009.  In  WEO  2009,  the 
dependent variable is given by log( government consumption expenditure) and a time 
trend is included as an additional explanatory variable for de -trending purposes. We 
apply the Hodrick–Prescott filter to government consumption since in many countries the 
series exhibits a strongly nonlinear trend. Cyclically-adjusted government consumption is 
given  by  the  residual  in  equation  (1).  It  can  be  regarded  as  a  measure  or  proxy  of 
discretionary fiscal policy, with a positive value indicating an expansionary stance. 
For  the  call  interest  rate,  the  following  equation  is  estimated  for  both  the  developed 
economy group and the developing economy group, using a panel estimation technique: 
real interest ratei,t = γ0 + γ1*GDP gapi,t + γ2*inflationi,t + γ3*dummy_85i,t + εi,t,       (2) 
where dummy_85 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for periods after 1985. 
As in WEO 2009, it is included to allow for a possible structural shift in the equilibrium 
interest rate.  Results do not change substantially when dummy_85 is excluded. The 
cyclically-adjusted interest rate is given by the residual in equation (2). Since equation 
(2) corresponds to the Taylor rule for monetary policy, a positive deviation from the rule 
can be regarded as a discretionary tightening of monetary policy. One may argue that a 
positive  coefficient  of  GDP  gap  in  equation  (2)  is  already  evidence  of  discretionary 
counter-cyclical changes in monetary policy. Since central banks do not officially adopt 
the Taylor rule in their conduct of monetary policy, a systematic relationship between the 
interest rate and GDP gap itself may be an outcome of discretionary monetary policy. 
Also, even when central banks actually follow a rule similar to the Taylor rule, they are 
taking an active role in trying to stabilize the economy since the Taylor rule is considered 
an active, not passive, rule. These arguments suggest that equation (2) may provide too 
much filtration. Fortunately, the exact method of cyclical adjustment turns out not to be 
critically important for our analysis. Upon estimating an equation with no GDP gap on the 
right-hand side, we find that our main results do not change substantially.
5  
                                                  
4  A smoothing parameter of 6.25 is used for an annual series and a parameter of 1600 is used for a 
quarterly series. 
5  Our main results are robust to some other variations in the cyclical adjustment process. For example, 
we estimated equations (1) and (2) for each country separately and obtained similar results.  
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Another  concern  may  be  that  our  GDP  data  are  annual,  while  the  interest  rate  and 
inflation rate are both available quarterly. To check on the appropriateness of using GDP 
gap measures obtained from annual GDP series in combination with quarterly series of 
the other variables, we examine OECD countries in which both annual and seasonally-
adjusted  quarterly  series  are  available  for  GDP.  Figure  2  shows  that  the  two  series 
produce similar output gap measures. On this basis, we proceed to use annual GDP gap 
series in combination with quarterly interest rate and inflation series in our analysis of 
financial downturns. 
Now, using cyclically-adjusted policy variables obtained from equations (1) and (2), we 
can  measure  the  policy  response  over  the  course  of  a  recession  or  downturn. 
Specifically, we define the policy response as the cumulative sum of changes in the 
cyclically-adjusted policy variable during a recession or downturn from peak to trough.  
 
 
3.   Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1   Stylized Facts about Recovery 
 
We first provide some summary statistics about recovery in Table 1. The two measures 
of  recovery  mentioned  above  are  computed  separately  for  OECD  economies  and 
developing Asian economies. As the table shows, among OECD economies, it  takes 
1.44 years on average for GDP to recover its previous peak after hitting a trough. Since 
our data are annual, any recovery period shorter than 1 year will be counted as 1 year, 
causing an upward bias in our estimate of time until recovery. WEO 2009, which uses 
quarterly data, reports that the average duration of recovery is 3.22 quarters for the 
same OECD economies. 
For developing Asia, the average duration of recovery is 2.3 years, which is substantially 
longer  than  the  OECD  average.  However,  a  closer  look  at  the  data  shows  that  the 
average value for Asia is being influenced by a few outlier observations, including the 
severe recessions of 1979–1981 in Brunei Darussalam and 1997–1998 in Papua New 
Guinea. The recovery to previous peaks took 21 and 8 years, respectively, in these two 
cases. With these two outliers excluded, the average duration is reduced to 1.76 years 
with a standard deviation of 1.48. Although both figures are still higher than their OECD 
counterparts, the difference is not statistically significant.  
Another way of looking at the pace of recovery is to estimate the  probability that an 
economy will remain below the previous peak beyond a certain number of years. The 
survival function—the probability to remain below the previous peak beyond a specified 
time—is estimated using a Weibull distribution. We exclude the aforementioned outliers 
in the estimation in order to provide a more representative and robust result. When they 
are  included,  the  difference  between  OECD  and  developing  Asian  economies  is 
magnified.  Figure  3  plots  the  survival  function  for  OECD  and  developing  Asian 
economies separately to show that for OECD economies the probability to ―survive‖ (or 
remain below the previous peak) is slightly higher than 60% 1 year after the trough and 
decreases  gradually  as  time  passes.  The  survival  function  takes  somewhat  higher 
values  for  developing  Asia,  indicating  that  it  takes  longer  for  an  Asian  economy  to  
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recover from a recession. The growth rate during the first year of recovery is 2.92% on 
average for the OECD and 5.25% for developing Asia. The difference largely reflects 
differences in the potential growth rate between the two regions. The all-time average of 
GDP growth is 3.33% for the OECD and 5.49% for developing Asia. Table 1 shows that 
an economy does not fully recover its potential growth rate in the first year after hitting a 
trough.
6  
Table 1 provides similar statistics for financial downturns as well. One difference is that 
since we use quarterly series for domestic credit and stock prices, the time until recovery 
now  refers  to  the  number  of  quarters.  For  both  the  OECD  and  developing  Asia, 
downturns in stock prices appear to be more persistent than downturns in domestic 
credit: the average time until recovery is 5 –6 quarters for domestic credit and 15–20 
quarters  for  stock  prices.
7 At the same time, the growth ra te during the first year of 
recovery is substantially higher for stock prices than for domestic credit. This suggests 
that stock prices exhibit much greater volatility as the peak to trough in stock prices is so 
sharp that even with the high post-trough growth rate a recovery to previous peak is not 
achieved until 4–5 years later. Another interesting and related pattern is that growth in 
the financial variables during the post-trough year is much higher than growth in ordinary 
years.  In  other  words, the  financial  variables  exhibit  mean  reverting  behavior.  These 
patterns, while being observed in both regions, are particularly strong in developing Asia.  
To  summarize,  recovery  from  financial  downturns  is  not  particularly  slower  in  Asia 
compared to the OECD. Time until recovery is similar between the two regions. Also, 
growth in financial variables is higher in Asia, largely reflecting differences in the long-
term growth trend between the two regions. What is more important is the great volatility 
that  Asia  exhibits  over  the  course  of  a  financial  downturn  and  recovery.  Hong  et  al. 
(2009) report that the peak-to-trough drop is sharper in Asia not only for GDP recessions, 
but  also  for  financial  downturns.  Table  1.2  shows  that  the  growth  rate  during  the 
recovery year is also greater in Asia. Together these results imply that Asian economies 
fall hard and recover fast. 
3.2   Policy Responses 
 
This section provides some stylized facts about policy responses. As explained above, 
we first need to make cyclical adjustment to our policy variables by estimating equations 
(1) and (2). The estimation results of equations (1) and (2) from using annual data are 
reported below. We identify outliers in each variable using  the method developed by 
Hadi  (1994)  and  exclude  them  before  running  regressions.
8  The  regressions  are 
estimated using a fixed-effects panel procedure. In order to reduce endogeneity bias, we 
use instrumental variables estimation for the government consumption equation, with the 
1-year lagged value of GDP gap as the instrument.  
                                                  
6  The average growth rate during the first year of recovery is not much influenced by the 1979–1981 
recession of Brunei Darussalam. 
7  The  time until recovery  may  be  underestimated because some  credit  contractions  and stock price 
declines were so persistent that the economy did not recover previous peak values during the sample 
period. For these extremely persistent episodes, time until recovery cannot be computed. 
8  Stata provides the routine for this procedure.  




government consumption gapi,t = constant + 0.72*GDP gapi,t 
                                                                      (5.57) 
Asia: 
government consumption gapi,t = constant + 1.14*GDP gapi,t 
                                                                      (3.84) 
OECD:    
real interest ratei,t = constant + 0.12*GDP gapi,t – 0.31*inflationi,t +0.01*dummy_85i,t 
                                                    (1.42)                (-10.40)                 (4.68) 
Asia:     
real interest ratei,t = constant + 0.11*GDP gapi,t – 0.47*inflationi,t +0.004*dummy_85i,t 
                                           (1.19)                (-11.84)                (1.00) 
 
Numbers in parentheses denote t-ratios. The coefficient for GDP gap is significant and 
positive for government consumption in both the OECD and developing Asia, confirming 
that  government  consumption  is  automatically  interrelated  with  GDP.  For  the  real 
interest rate, GDP gap is not significant even though it is positive, while inflation has a 
significant and negative effect. In order to check the robustness of these results, we 
consider an alternative cyclical adjustment for the interest rate using only inflation and 
dummy_85 as control variables. As will be shown below, the main results do not change 
substantially when using the cyclical-adjustment method. Although not reported here, we 
obtain  similar  results  from  using  quarterly  data  in  the  estimation  of  equation  (2): 
coefficients on the explanatory variables are  of the same sign and have roughly the 
same  magnitude.  As  explained  before,  to  maintain  data  consistency,  we  use  the 
(cyclically-adjusted) annual real interest rate series when analyzing GDP recessions and 
the quarterly series when analyzing financial downturns. 
3.2.1  GDP Recessions 
 
Policy responses are defined as the cumulative sum of changes in cyclically-adjusted 
government consumption or cyclically-adjusted call rates. A positive value of fiscal policy 
would mean an increase in government consumption, which is expansionary. On the 
other hand, a positive value of monetary policy would mean an increase in the call rate, 
which is contractionary. Table 2 shows how fiscal and monetary policies have responded 
to recessions and financial downturns in the OECD and developing Asia. All data are 
annual. We exclude outlier observations in cyclically-adjusted government consumption 
and  call  rates  before  computing  the  policy  measures.  Table  2  shows  that  for  GDP 
recessions  fiscal  policy  has  been  strongly  counter-cyclical  in  both  the  OECD  and 
developing Asia, reaching about 2.2% and 3.9%, respectively. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that actual government consumption increases during a recession. In  
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fact, with no cyclical adjustment, cumulative government consumption growth during a 
recession turns out to be –0.5% in Asia compared to 2.7% in the OECD.  
Monetary policy has also been counter-cyclical in the OECD economies. We report two 
measures of monetary policy in Table 2 that correspond to the two different methods of 
cyclical adjustment mentioned above. Monetary policy 1 is the benchmark measure that 
is based on equation (2). According to this measure, the cumulative decrease in the call 
rate during a GDP recession period is about 0.58 percentage points and significant at 
the 10% level. In developing Asian economies, however, the cumulative change in the 
interest rate is not significant, suggesting that Asian monetary authorities may not have 
been as active in changing the interest rate to moderate the effects of a recession. When 
we estimate equation (2) without GDP gap on the right-hand side, the resulting monetary 
policy  measure  turns  out  to  be  more  strongly  counter-cyclical  for  the  OECD  (–0.89 
percentage points), but still insignificant for developing Asia. Also, although not reported 
in  the  table,  we  have  used  quarterly  data  for  OECD  countries  and  obtained  similar 
patterns. Both fiscal and monetary policies turn expansionary during a recession among 
the OECD. 
The lack of significant counter-cyclicality in the monetary policies of developing Asian 
economies may be partly due to its small number of observations. Since the unit of 
observation in Table 2 is each recession episode, the number of observations is only 23 
for Asia and 55 for the OECD.
9 In order to avoid this problem, we consider an alternative 
approach by changing the unit of observation to each country -year and examining how 
changes in (cyclically-adjusted) government consumption and/or the interest rate differ 
between  recession  years and ordinary years.   Specifically, we estimate the following 
equation for the OECD and Asia separately, using ordinary least squares: 
Δcyclically adjusted real interest ratei,t = ʴ0 + ʴ1*dummy_recessioni,t                    (3) 
+ ʴ2*dummy_85i,t + η i,t 
where dummy_recessioni,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country i is in 
recession  in  year  t  and  0  otherwise.  A  significantly  negative  value  of  ʴ1  can  be 
interpreted as an evidence of counter-cyclical monetary policy. The estimation result, 
however, is not substantially different from Table 2. We find that the coefficient for the 
recession dummy is negative but still insignificant at the 5% level for Asia (with a t-ratio 
of –0.32) and significantly negative for the OECD (with a t-ratio of –2.08).
10 We repeat 
the same procedure with government consumption and obtain  a significantly positive 
coefficient on the recession dummy for both the OECD and Asia.  
 
                                                  
9  Also, the call interest rate may simply be a poor indicator of monetary policy action. Financial markets 
in many of these countries for most years were still relatively undeveloped and, hence, interest rates 
may not have been a key monetary policy indicator. 
10  As expected, when we cyclically adjust the call rate only with respect to the inflation rate, the coefficient 
of  the  recession  dummy  becomes  more  significant  for  OECD  economies  (t-ratio  of  –3.16).  The 
coefficient remains insignificant for Asian economies (t-ratio of 0.88).  
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3.2.2   Financial Downturns 
Policy responses during financial downturns are also provided in Table 2. As mentioned 
above, we use quarterly data both to identify financial downturns and to measure fiscal 
and monetary policy changes during the downturn periods. The most notable pattern in 
Table 2 regarding financial downturns is that  monetary policy becomes expansionary 
during  credit  contractions  in  the  OECD  and  developing  Asia  alike.  The  cumulative 
decrease in the call rate is about 0.8% for the OECD and about 4.6% in Asia. Monetary 
policy response is much greater in developing Asia perhaps because credit contractions 
in the region are more severe than those in the OECD. Hong et al. (2009) report that the 
amplitude  of  credit  contractions  is  18.47%  in  Asian  economies  and  7.3%  in  OECD 
economies. The severity of credit contractions in Asia can also be inferred from Table 1, 
which shows that while credit growth during the first year of recovery is much higher in 
Asia, the time until recovery is similar between the two regions. This is possible only if 
the initial peak-to-trough drop is similarly large for Asia. 
Unlike monetary policy, fiscal policy does not exhibit a systematic pattern during credit 
contractions. In OECD economies, the fiscal policy measure is close to zero, indicating 
that government consumption remains largely neutral during credit contractions. In Asian 
economies, on the other hand, the mean of the fiscal policy measure is significantly 
negative.  It  is  not  obvious  why  the  government  would  adopt  a  contractionary  policy 
during times of financial downturns. One possibility is that the government may be forced 
to tighten its budget under a crisis situation. For example, the IMF initially recommended 
tight fiscal policies for Korea in response to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. However, 
the initial prescription was abandoned in 1998 as the economic downturn turned out to 
be  much  worse  than  expected.  In  addition,  there  are  quasi-fiscal  activities  of  public 
enterprises, public funds, and contingent liabilities from government guarantee programs 
that are not included in the official budget balance figures. When these items are taken 
into account, the true fiscal position of Korea may well have been more expansionary 
than official figures suggest. Our data also show that Korea and other Asian economies 
in 1998 recorded an increase in cyclically-adjusted government consumption.  
A closer look at the data suggests that the significantly negative value of fiscal policy 
during credit contractions may be an artifact driven by a few exceptional cases. We find 
that  Indonesia  in  1974,  Pakistan  in  1974,  and  Sri  Lanka  in  1994  (where  the  years 
indicate troughs) experienced unusually large drop in government consumption, with the 
cumulative fiscal policy measure reaching below –60% in all cases. When these three 
observations (out of 78) are excluded, the mean is no longer significant. Indeed, the 
median is also insignificant, supporting the argument that the mean is influenced by a 
few extreme cases. 
For stock price declines, we do not find any systematic policy responses in either of the 
two  regions.  The  only  significant  figure  is  the  median  of  fiscal  policy  for  OECD 
economies. We believe this is consistent with common expectations: the government or 
monetary authorities do not set their policies based on particular asset prices. 
Clearly,  GDP  recessions  and  financial  downturns  sometimes  overlap  and  they  both 
affect policy decisions. Therefore, the univariate statistics in Table 2 may not accurately  
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represent  independent  effects  of  GDP  recessions  and  financial  downturns  on  policy 
variables.  In  order  to  separate  policy  responses  to  GDP  recessions  from  those 
associated with financial downturns, we estimate the following equation: 
   Δcyclically adjusted real interest ratei,t = ʴ0 + ʴ1*dummy_recessioni,t              (4) 
                                  + ʴ2*dummy_85i,t + ʴ3*dummy_credit contractioni,t + η i,t      
 
where dummy_credit contraction is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for credit 
contraction  periods.  Coefficients  ʴ1  and  ʴ3  can  be  interpreted  as  representing  the 
response of monetary policy to GDP recessions and credit contractions, respectively. We 
do not include a dummy variable for stock price declines based on the result in Table 2. 
Also, we do not estimate a similar equation for government consumption because, as 
Table 2 shows, fiscal policy responds only to GDP recessions.
11 Estimation results are 
provided in Table 3. Interest rate series are cyclically adjusted  using both inflation and 
GDP gap for columns (1) and (3) , and only inflation for columns (2) and (4). The most 
evident pattern in Table 3 is that the interest rate tends to decrease during credit 
contractions. Once the effect of credit contractions is con trolled, the interest rate does 
not exhibit a significant decrease in recession years, even in OECD economies  (column 
[1]). Only when the effect of GDP gap is not controlled in advance  is the interest rate 
shown to decrease significantly during recessions  in the same economies (column [2]). 
This suggests that the interest rate does not decrease during recessions more than 
implied by the Taylor rule. In developing Asia, the interest rate does not decrease in 
response to GDP recessions regardless of the cycli cal adjustment method, confirming 
the result in Table 2.   
Overall,  Table  2  suggests  that  OECD  economies  have  been  more  actively  using 
counter-cyclical policies than Asian economies in the face of GDP recessions. During 
credit contractions, countries in both groupings have pursued interest rate cuts.  
3.3   Policy Responses and Recovery 
 
In  this  section,  we  examine  whether  counter-cyclical  policies  promote  recovery.  In 
particular, we estimate the following two equations that correspond to our two recovery 
measures: 
growth during the first year of recoveryi,t = ʴ0 + ʴ1*fiscal policyi,t                      (5) 
                                                            + ʴ2*monetary policyi,t + δ’Xi,t + η i,t 
 




γ)                      (6) 
 
Equation  (5)  specifies  growth  in  GDP  or  financial  variables  during  the  first  year  of 
recovery as a linear function of policy and control variables. The subscript i,t denotes 
downturn  t  in  country  i.  The  monetary  policy  measure  used  here  is  the  same  as 
monetary policy 1 in Table 2. The main results do not change when monetary policy 2 is 
used. The control variable vector X includes the peak-to-trough amplitude of a downturn 
                                                  
11  We have considered these variations and found that none of them changes the main patterns.  
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and some foreign policy variables.
12 The peak-to-trough amplitude is included to capture 
possible interrelation between the severity of a downturn and the pace of subsequent 
recovery. To the extent that there is overshooting in the initial drop, a greater absolute 
value of the amplitude   will imply higher growth in the following periods. Also, the 
macroeconomic policy stance of big countries like US , Japan, and Germany may have 
important implications for other countries’ recovery. In order to examine the international 
spillover  effects,  we  consider  changes  in  the  cyclically-adjusted  interest  rate  and 
changes  in  cyclically-adjusted  government  consumption  in  the  year  immediately 
preceding a trough. Equation (5) is estimated using a panel model with fixed effects.  
Equation  (6)  specifies  the  probability  density  of  recovery  as  a  Weibull  function.  The 
variable ti in equation (6) denotes the event time (the time of recovery) of an individual i 
(economic downturn i); zi and β the covariate vector of individual i and the corresponding 
coefficient  vector,  respectively;  and  γ  the  shape  parameter  of  the  distribution.  The 
covariate vector z includes the same explanatory variables as in equation (5). For both 
equations, the unit of observation is each downturn episode rather than a country-year.  
3.3.1   GDP Recessions 
 
We first estimate equation (5) using GDP recessions from the OECD and developing 
Asia collectively and provide the results in Table 4. When each region is used separately, 
the number of observations is too small—only 19 for Asia and 54 for the OECD—and the 
results are less significant in most cases. Estimation results from using only the Asian 
country sample will be further discussed in Table 7. One of the most robust findings in 
Table 4 is the significantly positive effect of fiscal policy on the post-trough growth rate. 
The estimated coefficient implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the fiscal policy 
measure will lead to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate.
13 Previous 
studies on fiscal policy have typically found that the fiscal multiplier effect is quite small. 
One exception has been WEO 2009 where  the fiscal policy response was shown to be 
important for the strength of recovery in OECD economies. Applying the same approach 
to annual data from OECD and developing  Asian economies, we confirm the finding of 
WEO 2009.  However, probably due to the small number of observations, we do not 
obtain  any  significant  result  when  equation  (5)  is  estimated  for  the  OECD  and 
developing Asia separately.
14 Another robust  finding in Table 4 is the  insignificance of 
monetary policy. The  coefficient of the monetary policy measure is close to zero in all 
specifications.  This  result  is  also  broadly  consistent  with  WEO  2009  where  the 
coefficient of monetary policy is estimated to be insignificant in most specifications. The 
coefficient  of  the  absolute  value  of  amplitude  is  always  positive  and  occasionally 
                                                  
12  The duration of a downturn is found to always be insignificant and thus has been dropped. 
13  Since government consumption amounts to about 15% of GDP in our sample, a 1 percentage point 
increase  in  government  consumption  growth  corresponds  to  about  0.15%  growth  in  GDP.  The 
coefficient of 0.3 in Table 4 thus implies that the short-term multiplier may be as high as 2 (i.e., 2 = 
0.3/0.15). 
14  WEO  2009,  which  uses  quarterly  data  for  OECD  economies,  has  more  than  100  observations 
(recession episodes) for the OECD alone.   
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significant,  indicating  that  the  greater  the  initial  fall  the  more  rapidly  the  economy 
recovers.
15 
Among the  foreign  policy variables that  we consider,  the  monetary policy of Japan 
seems to have the most significant and robust effect on other countries ’ recovery. As 
columns (3) and (4) show, an increase in the cyclically-adjusted interest rate in Japan is 
significantly  and  negatively  associated  with  GDP  growth  in  other  countries.  The 
monetary policy of the US is not as significant as that of Japan, probably because our 
sample is heavily representative of Asian economies with strong financial ties with Japan. 
Although not reported in this paper, we have examined the monetary policy of Germany 
as well and found that it is insignificant in most cases. Foreign fiscal policy variables are 
also mostly insignificant. However, US fiscal policy has a significantly positive coefficient 
in column (4) where the fiscal and monetary policy variables of Japan and the US are 
included at the same time. While not as robust as the effect of Japan’s monetary policy, 
the result in column (4) is at least not inconsistent with common expectations. Overall, 
these results support the view that international policy coordination can be critical for 
recovery from a crisis. 
Estimation results of equation (6) are provided in Table 5. As before, GDP recessions 
from  the  OECD  and  developing  Asia  are  considered  together.  Since  equation  (6) 
specifies the probability of recovery (or the hazard of exiting a recessionary state during 
which  GDP  remains  below  the  previous  peak),  a  variable  with  a  positive  coefficient 
should  be  interpreted  as  promoting  recovery.  Estimates  reported  in  Table  5  denote 
coefficients rather than exponentiated coefficients, i.e., coefficients rather than hazard 
ratios. Results in Table 5 are broadly consistent with results in Table 4. First, among 
domestic policy responses, fiscal policy appears to be more important than monetary 
policy: the coefficient on fiscal policy is always significantly positive, while the coefficient 
on  monetary  policy  is  always  insignificant.  Second,  among  foreign  policy  variables, 
Japan’s monetary policy is most important. An increase in Japan’s interest rate tends to 
deter recovery. All other policy variables are insignificant in all specifications. Third, the 
coefficient  of  the  absolute  value  of  amplitude  is  always  significant  and  negative, 
indicating that the larger the drop the longer it takes to recover. This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the positive coefficient of the same variable reported in Table 4. For a 
recession  with  a  large  peak-to-trough  drop,  it  is  entirely  possible  to  have  high  post-
trough growth and yet not recover to the previous peak quickly. 
Results  in  Tables  4  and  5  suggest  that  expansionary  macroeconomic  policies,  in 
particular expansionary fiscal policies, can bring about a quick recovery. However, as 
some people argue, expansionary policies may also entail possible negative impacts in 
the medium-term such as an increased fiscal burden, asset price bubble, and incomplete 
structural adjustment. These negative outcomes may in turn increase the possibility of a 
recurring  recession.  In  order  to  examine  medium-term  implications  of  expansionary 
macroeconomic  policies,  we  estimate  the  following  probit  equation  that  relates  the 
recurrence probability of a recession with short-term policy responses: 
                                                  
15  WEO 2009 reports the opposite in using the peak-to-trough amplitude without any transformation to 
still obtain a positive coefficient. It is not clear where the discrepancy between WEO 2009 and our 
result stems from. We have examined quarterly data for OECD countries following WEO 2009 and still 
found that a greater downturn is associated with a faster recovery.  
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probability of recurrencei = Ф(ʱ0 + ʱ1*fiscal policyi + ʱ2*monetary policyi + ʱ’Xi + ηi), (7) 
where  Ф  is  the  cumulative  normal  distribution  function  and  the  subscript  i  denotes 
recession i. The vector of controlling variables, X, is the same as before. The recurrence 
of a recession is defined by an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if another 
recession occurs during the 5 years subsequent to the trough year of recession i and 
takes  the  value  of  0  otherwise.  The  sample  probability  of  recurrence  is  0.28.  The 
estimation  results  of  equation  (7)  are  provided  in  Table 6.  As  the  table  shows,  the 
recurrence probability is positively associated with monetary policy or an increase in the 
interest  rate.  In  Tables  4  and  5,  recovery  from  a  recession  was  shown  to  be 
systematically correlated with fiscal policy but not with monetary policy. Table 6 shows 
that monetary policy may be important for medium-term performance of the economy. It 
also suggests that in contrast to the concerns about possible side effects, the positive 
effects of an expansionary policy may outweigh negative ones in the medium-term.  
Another clear pattern in Table 6 is the significant and negative correlation between the 
recurrence probability and the absolute value of amplitude. As shown in Table 4, the 
absolute  magnitude  of  amplitude  is  positively  associated  with  the  post-trough  GDP 
growth  rate,  suggesting  that  the  economy  may  be  overreacting  to  negative  shocks 
during a recession period and thus the trough may be unnecessarily deep. The negative 
correlation between the recurrence probability and the absolute value of amplitude, on 
the other hand, suggests that the economy may become more robust after a severe 
recession. While a deep recession might be painful in the short-run, in the long-run it 
might force policymakers to undertake necessary reforms that would make the economy 
more immune to another recession. Among foreign policy variables, fiscal stimulus in 
Germany is shown to significantly lower the recurrence probability in other countries. 
While the coefficient of US fiscal policy has the wrong sign, it is significant only at the 
10% level.  
In  Table  7,  we  briefly  examine  how  the  estimation  results  change  when  only  Asian 
recessions are used in the sample. US and German policy variables are excluded from 
explanatory variables because Japan’s policy stance seems to be most important for 
Asian economies and also because the sample size is only 19. Column (1) estimates 
equation (5), while columns  (2) and (3) estimate equations  (6) and (7), respectively. 
Table  7  shows  that  despite  the  small  number  of  observations,  coefficients  of 
macroeconomic policy variables are still significant and have the right sign in most cases. 
For  example,  the  GDP  growth  rate  during  the  first  year  of  recovery  is  positively 
correlated  with  fiscal  stimulus  and  negatively  correlated  with  a  higher  interest  rate 
(column [1]). Overall, Table 7 supports the view that counter-cyclical policies have been 
largely successful in promoting recovery from GDP recessions in Asia. 
3.3.2   Financial Downturns 
We have examined how macroeconomic policy responses during a recession can affect 
the  pace  of  recovery,  using  various  estimation  methods.  Now  we  repeat  the  same 
analyses  for  financial  downturns.  The  unit  of  observation  is  each  episode  of  credit 
contraction and/or stock price decline. The number of financial downturns is greater than 
the  number  of  GDP  recessions,  partly  because  we  use  quarterly  data  for  financial  
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downturns and partly because financial variables are inherently more volatile than GDP. 
The large number of observations enables us to estimate equations (5), (6), and (7) 
separately for OECD and developing Asian economies, and make comparison between 
the two groupings.
16  
We first estimate equations (5), (6), and (7) for credit contractions, and report the results 
in Tables 8, 9, and 10, respectively. Column (1) of Table  8 shows that, among OECD 
economies, the growth  rate of  domestic credit during  the  first year of  recovery is 
positively associated with increases in government consumption (our measure of f iscal 
policy)  and  negatively  associated  with  increases  in  the  call  rate  (our  measure  of 
monetary  policy).  This  result  is  consistent  with  common  views  on  the  role  of 
expansionary  macroeconomic  policies.  Columns  (2)  through  (4)  add  foreign  policy 
variables. All foreign policy variables are defined as the sum of changes in government 
consumption or the call rate over the 1-year period (four quarters) immediately preceding 
a trough. According to columns (2) through (4), none of the foreign policy variables 
considered is significant. We estimate the same equations for Asian economies in 
columns (5) through (8) and find that in contrast to the case of  the OECD, domestic 
fiscal and monetary policies do not have significant effects on the strength of recovery. 
As before, foreign policy variables are all insignificant.  However, one can formally show 
that the coefficients of domestic policy variables are significantly different between  the 
OECD and Asia. This difference suggests that the OECD has been more successful with 
its policy responses to a credit contraction.  
Table 9 shows how the probability of exiting a credit contraction episode is determined. 
The most evident result in the table is the significantly negative effect of the absolute 
value of amplitude on the hazard rate. This simply indicates that the greater the peak-to-
trough drop is, the longer it takes to return to the previous peak level. The next strongest 
pattern is that the coefficient o f  Japan’s  monetary  policy  is  significantly  negative  for 
Asian  economies.  This  result  is  also  consistent  with  common  expectations  since  a 
contractionary monetary policy in  a leading country will likely deter recovery in other 
countries. Lastly,  the fiscal policy of the US has a positive effect on  the recovery of 
OECD economies, but the effect is only marginally significant at the 10% level. 
The recurrence probability of a credit contraction is not well explained by our explanatory 
variables. As before, recurrence is defined as another depressive episode that occurs 
within 5 years.
17 As Table 10 shows, the only significant result at the  5% level is the 
negative correlation between US monetary policy and the recurrence in the  OECD 
sample. This result implies that credit contractions that coincide  with an interest rate cut 
in the US are more likely to be followed by another credit contraction in the medium-term. 
It is not immediately clear, however, why such a pattern should be observed.
18 While it is 
often argued that expansionary policies can entail negative impacts in the medium-term 
                                                  
16  Although not reported in the table, when we merge OECD and Asian economies in one sample and 
impose equality restrictions on the coefficients across the two regions, the estimation results lose much 
of their significance. 
17  The sample recurrence probability is 0.67 for the OECD and 0.68 for Asia. 
18  A possible explanation can be gleaned from one of the oft-cited cause of the current global crisis: the 
long-period of low interest rates pursued by the US Federal Reserve after the 2001 recession.   
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by  causing  a  delay  in  necessary  reforms  and  adjustments,  Table  10  shows  no 
significantly  negative  impacts  from  domestic  monetary  policies.  In  fact,  according  to 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 10, a more expansionary monetary policy (a decrease in 
the interest rate) implies a lower probability of a recurring credit contraction. It is hard to 
explain why a US interest rate cut should have negative medium-term implications for 
OECD economies when a domestic one does not. We suspect that our foreign policy 
variables have an endogeneity problem when used for the OECD sample because the 
three countries—Germany, Japan, and the US—are all members of the OECD and have 
mutual influence with other OECD member countries. The estimated effects of foreign 
policy variables for the OECD sample thus need to be taken with caution. We believe 
that the exogeneity assumption of the foreign policy variables is better met for Asian 
economies. In addition to domestic monetary policies, domestic fiscal policies also have 
a  marginally  significant  effect  on  the  recurrence  probability.  Columns  (1)  through  (4) 
show  that  for  OECD  economies  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  lowers  the  recurrence 
probability.  
Next, we estimate equations (5), (6), and (7) for stock price declines and report the 
results in Tables 11, 12, and 13, respectively. Table 11 shows that the growth rate of 
stock prices 1 year into the recovery phase is not systematically correlated with anything 
in either the OECD or Asia. The only exception is the monetary policy of Japan, which is 
shown to have significantly negative effects on the stock returns of OECD economies. 
The overall lack of significant patterns in Table 11 is consistent with the proposition that 
stock returns follow a random process that is not easily predicted. 
The probability of recovering the previous peak level in stock prices is systematically 
correlated with the amplitude and some foreign policy variables. As Table 12 shows, the 
coefficient of the absolute value of the amplitude is significantly negative for both the 
OECD  and  developing  Asia,  indicating  that  a  greater  initial  drop  delays  the  time  to 
recovery.  Among  other  variables,  the  fiscal  policy  of  Japan  and  monetary  policy  of 
Germany both have a marginally significant and negative impact for the OECD sample. 
Again, the mixture of correct and wrong signs may be a consequence of the endogeneity 
bias  mentioned  above.  For  the  developing-Asia  sample,  both  the  monetary  policy  of 
Japan and fiscal policy of the US have significant impacts with correct signs: an increase 
in  Japan’s  interest  rate  deters  recovery,  while  an  increase  in  US  government 
consumption promotes recovery.  
The probability of a recurring stock price decline is similar to the probability of a recurring 
credit contraction in that it is not well explained by our specifications. Since a stock price 
decline  episode  is  almost  surely  followed  by  another  within  5 years,  we  redefine 
recurrence here as another depressive episode that occurs within 3 years.
19 The main 
results do not change when we vary the window size. Table 13 shows that in the OECD 
sample the coefficient o f  US monetary policy is significantly negative. This result is 
reminiscent of the negative correlation between US monetary policy and the recurrence 
of credit contraction. Another  significant result in Table 13 is that the absolute value of 
the amplitude has a positive impact on the recurrence probability. In other words, a large 
                                                  
19  With  this  new  definition,  the  sample  recurrence  probability  is  0.75  for  the  OECD  and  0.82  for 
developing Asia.  
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drop in stock prices is more likely to be followed by another stock price decline within the 
next 3 years than a small drop would be.  
4.   Counter-Cyclical Policies in the Current Global Recession 
 
In this section, we provide anecdotal evidence of fiscal and monetary policies used in 
Asia to combat the global recession. By and large, we find that stimulative policies have 
supported economic activity. In our previous paper (Hong et al. 2009), we cautioned that 
Asia would experience a severe recession in 2009 in view of the global recession and 
financial downturns that were underway.  Yet, we recognized that much of the actual 
outcome would depend on the counter-cyclical measures implemented. Encouragingly, 
the evidence seems to point to a positive outcome as emerging Asia only registered 
2 quarters of negative growth on the back of aggressive policy easing (Figure 4). Public 
consumption  was  essentially  the  key  driver  of  growth  when  the  region  went  into 
recession  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2008.  Since  then,  its  contribution  has  remained 
sizeable  with  specific  fiscal  measures  that  support  private  consumption  also  making 
stronger  contributions.  Similarly,  there  has  been  a  gradual  recovery  in  investments, 
which  obviously  takes  longer  to  come  to  fruition.  Figure  5  breaks  down  the  growth 
drivers into smaller sub-regions and individual countries for the first 3 quarters of 2009. 
As evidence of the oft-mentioned fiscal muscle of the PRC, all growth during the first 
3 quarters of 2009 was due to higher investment and consumption.
20 Public consumption 
was central in all economies , especially when  considering that net export growth was 
mainly due to the larger fall in imports than exports.  Besides  the  PRC, India and 
Indonesia are the only countries that did not enter into recession and experience a sharp 
pullback in investment.
21 They also happen to be the most populated  countries  and 
relatively-less-open economies in the region.  
The  discretionary  fiscal  stimulus  packages  implemented  in  the  wake  of  the  global 
financial crisis  have been sizeable,  expenditure driven, and quickly delivered. A quick 
glance at the fiscal balance of the central government underlines the massive scale of 
expansion undertaken, which swings from a mere average deficit of 0.6% of GDP  from 
2000 to 2008 to –4.2% of GDP in 2009 (Table 14). No country shows an improvement in 
its  fiscal  position  in  2009,  which  of  course  is  also  partly  due  to  lower  tax  revenue 
collected  given  depressed  economic  activity.  In  terms  of  the  size  of  discretionary 
stimulus, IMF (2009b) estimates that Asia's discretionary fiscal stimulus amounted to 
2.7% of GDP in 2009, higher than the 2.0% among the G20. In smaller sub-groups, the 
newly industrialized economies’ (NIEs) level of discretionary fiscal stimulus in 2009 was 
2.6%, the PRC’s and India's was 2.7%, and ASEAN-5's was 1.8%.
22 Also significant is 
                                                  
20  The PRC does not breakdown investment and consumption into the public and private components in 
its quarterly series. 
21  Technically,  the  Philippines  also  did  not  enter  into  recession.  Still,  its  growth  was  only  marginally 
positive and the economy saw a sharp slowdown in investments and exports. The continued strong 
inflows  of  remittances  from  its  large  population  of  overseas  workers  were  most  helpful  in  keeping 
private consumption vibrant. Despite the global economic turbulence, USD12.8 billion was remitted 
back to the country over the 9 months to September 2009, which was 4.2% higher than the same 
period in 2008 (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 2009).  
22  ASEAN-5 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam.   
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the fact that in Asia, 82% of the stimulus represents increased government spending 
(rather  than  tax  measures)  compared  to  74%  in  G20.  Government  spending  has  a 
higher  likelihood  and  more  direct  way  of  stimulating  growth  as  opposed  to  tax  cuts, 
where income saved may or may not induce individuals and corporations to consume or 
invest. Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Malaysia, PRC, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam all have fiscal stimulus packages with more than 80% based on 
expenditure spending (World Bank 2009). Only India, Indonesia, and Korea included 
notable tax cuts on labor, consumption, or capital in their respective fiscal packages.
23 In 
addition, what has been encouraging is the quick disbursement of much of the stimulus  
funds. The World Bank report also shows that many countries have delivered more fiscal 
stimulus  than what they  officially  announced  (Figure  6).  Even low-income countries, 
such as  Cambodia and Lao PDR ,  which were thought  to be unable to  afford  fiscal 
stimulus measures, have  implemented such programs  through  domestic sources of 
funding from the government's own deposits and borrowing from banks.  
 
Fiscal stimulus appears to have had a positive impact on growth. While most of the fiscal 
stimulus measures exhibit the qualities of an effective counter -cyclical policy, the exact 
impact on growth of the stimulus  is not easily estimated and remains subject to great 
debate.
24 That said, the IMF (2009a) in its report to the G20 Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors Meeting in March  2010  suggests  a low–high  multiplier  range  for  different 
fiscal measures: 0.3–0.6 for revenue, 0.5–1.8 for capital spending, and 0.3–1.0 for other 
spending. Based on these ranges, IMF (2009b) estimates that Korea’s fiscal stimulus 
added as much as 0.9–2.8 percentage points over baseline growth in the first half of 
2009, while the PRC’s measures added 0.7–2.3 percentage points over the same period 
(Figure 7). Even the much smaller and more open economies of Hong Kong, China; 
Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand saw an improvement of 0.5–
1.5  percentage  points.  While  not  being  able  to  reverse  the  contracting  forces  in  an 
economy, the fiscal stimulus can nonetheless cushion an otherwise much harder landing.  
 
Aggressive monetary policy strategies through reductions in the policy rate and statutory 
reserve  requirement  ratio,  and  moral  suasion  for  greater  lending  can  provide  a 
conducive environment that supports growth. Table 15 compares the policy and lending 
rate reductions in selected Asian countries during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and 
the 2008/09 global crisis. Several stylized facts can be observed. First, current monetary 
policies have been more aggressive in terms of duration as it took only 6 months on 
average to bring interest rates to their trough during the 2008/09 global crisis compared 
to 11 months in the 1997/98 episode. Second, outside of the most severely hit countries 
by the Asian financial crisis, this current episode of monetary policy easing has been 
most widespread and aggressive when both the amplitude and duration are accounted 
for.  This  is  most  notable  in  Hong  Kong,  China;  India;  and  Taipei,China  where  their 
slopes (ratio of amplitude to duration) are much steeper than during the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis. Third, the above-mentioned observations also apply to instances when 
                                                  
23  For  details  of  the  fiscal  stimulus  packages  announced  and  their  composition  in  selected  Asian 
countries, see Table 2.3 in ADB (2009) and Annex 1 in UNESCAP (2009). 
24  See Barro (2009), Barro and Redlick (2009), Cogan et al. (2009), Feldstein (2009), and Romer and 
Bernstein  (2009)  for  the  debate  on  the  efficacy  of  fiscal  stimulus  in  the  US.  Also  the  debate  on 
Keynesian principles at  The  Economist: http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/276/print/all  
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lending rates have fallen much faster than during the earlier crisis and countries outside 
those  most  severely  hit  by  the  1997/98  Asian  financial  crisis  have  been  the  most 
aggressive. Fourth, it appears that the pass-through of policy rates to lending rates has 
improved in the current crisis as lending rates have fallen by as much as policy rates, 
which is reflected much earlier in the lending rates. This reinforces the empirical finding 
of IMF (2009b) that rejects the claim that the transmission of policy rates to lending rates 
has weakened during the current crisis. It is positive that lower interest rates are passed 
to borrowers, but this does not necessarily translate into higher levels of bank lending. 
Despite  the  very  uncertain  and  weak  business  and  employment  prospects  faced  by 
borrowers, it is encouraging to note that there has not been a widespread collapse of 
bank lending.  Bank loan growth has softened from its previous peak, which is to be 
expected in such difficult times, yet it remains in positive territory and is holding up well 
when  examined  in  a  longer-term  perspective  (Figures  8  and  9).  This  bears  little 
resemblance to the credit crunch of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Instead, in the 
PRC and Viet Nam, the surge in bank lending has been so marked that there have been 
renewed fears of misdirected lending propping up asset bubbles. Only in Taipei,China 
and Hong Kong, China has bank loan growth slid into negative territory, although both 
are now showing signs of a lending recovery.  
 
Monetary  conditions  have  generally  remained  loose,  but  would  have  been  more 
expansionary  if  not  for  falling  prices.  Except  for  Korea,  the  real  policy  rate  remains 
slightly positive in emerging East Asia, averaging about 2.8% (Figure 10) compared to 
around 0.5% in the US. Viet Nam has reduced its policy rate the most as indicated by 
the size of its bubble in the chart, although the reductions occurred from a high base. In 
the PRC; Malaysia; Taipei,China; and Thailand; real policy rates would have been even 
lower if not for deflation. The loose monetary conditions have also been aided by the 
depreciation  of  most  currencies  against  the  US  dollar.  Now  that  the  recovery  is 
underway, further policy rate reductions seem unlikely. Still, Asian central banks have 
not been as aggressive as their Western counterparts. The most probable cause is that 
the  heart  of  the  crisis  lies  in  the  West  and  was  exacerbated  by  the  overleveraged 
positions of financial institutions and consumers.  
 
In  the  West,  lower  interest  rates  are  most  useful  in  lowering  the  cost  of  borrowing, 
improving  debt  serviceability,  and  alleviating  the  balance  sheet  deterioration  of 
borrowers and, in turn, lenders. In contrast, there is no such over-borrowing problem 
among most Asian financial institutions, corporations, and consumers, especially after 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Perhaps more importantly, an interest rate that is too 
low reduces the return on individual savings, which in Asia applies to most consumers 
and, as a result, jeopardizes the very driver of growth that policymakers are trying to 
promote.  Moreover,  a  very  low  interest  rate  may  not  necessarily  entice  increased 
borrowing when business prospects remain uncertain. Coupled with the ample liquidity 
released into the financial system, this could incentivize funds to move into unproductive 
areas. Besides, prices are unlikely to fall any further as the underlying structural causes 
pushing  up  commodity  prices  in  2007  and  early  2008  have  not  disappeared.  A  key 
takeaway point that emerged from the recently concluded United Nations (UN) World 
Summit on Food Security in November 2009 was that the current global downturn only 
temporarily masked upward price pressures and as soon as the global recovery gains 
traction rapidly rising prices will return (Diouf 2009). Even without the global economy  
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regaining its full vigor, we are already witnessing strong price increases in many classes 
of commodities amid very low global interest rates. 
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have examined the role of macroeconomic policies in recovery from 
GDP recessions and financial downturns among Asian economies. Our analysis shows 
that  Asian  economies  have  been  more  dependent  on  fiscal  policies  than  monetary 
policies  as  a  means  to  counter  GDP  recessions.  Government  spending  in  Asian 
economies increases significantly during a recession, while the interest rate does not 
exhibit  a  systematic  pattern.  In  contrast,  OECD  economies  have  used  fiscal  and 
monetary  policies  effectively  to  counter  GDP  recessions.  During  credit  contractions, 
monetary policies appear to have been more important than fiscal policies in both Asia 
and the OECD. Overall, we find that macroeconomic policies change counter-cyclically 
during economic downturns in both regions.  
We  also  find  that  counter-cyclical  policies  promote  recovery.  In  Asian  economies  in 
particular, discretionary increases in government spending and discretionary reductions 
in the interest rate during a recession period are positively associated with GDP growth 
in the post-trough year. Monetary policies seem to matter in the medium-term as well: an 
interest rate cut during a recession lowers the probability of another recession in the next 
5 years.  For  recovery  from  a  credit  contraction,  only  monetary  policies  in  OECD 
economies  are  shown  to  have  a  significant  effect.  Among  Asian  economies,  the 
monetary policy stance of Japan seems to be more important than the domestic stance. 
While neither fiscal nor monetary policies have a significant effect on recovery from a 
stock price decline, this is consistent with the proposition that stock returns are not easily 
predictable. 
 
Our estimate of the effect of fiscal policy is substantially greater than most previous ones. 
According to Table 4, a 1 percentage point increase in government consumption growth 
during the recession period leads to a roughly 0.3 percentage point increase in GDP 
growth during the first year of the recovery phase. Since government consumption is 
about 15% of GDP among our sample, a 1 percentage point increase in government 
consumption growth corresponds to additional government consumption of about 0.15% 
of GDP. The coefficient of 0.3 in Table 4 thus implies that the short-term multiplier may 
be as high as 2 (i.e., 2 = 0.3/0.15). Most previous studies, on the other hand, argue that 
the expansionary effect of fiscal policies (or the fiscal multiplier) is only moderate. While 
there is a wide range of estimates, previous studies typically find that the short-term 
fiscal multiplier is less than 1 (Barro and Redlick, 2009 and OECD Economic Outlook, 
2009). It is not clear why our estimate of the fiscal policy effect is so large. One possible 
explanation is that in contrast to previous studies that examine all sample years we only 
use recession periods in our estimation. Since a demand stimulus can be effective only 
when there is slack in the economy, the fiscal multiplier may become greater during a 
recession. Anecdotal evidence from the current global crisis and recession supports this 
explanation.  Coupled  with  aggressive  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  moves,  Asian 
economies have experienced a strong rebound. Another possibility is that government 
consumption expenditure during a recession may proxy overall fiscal outlay that includes  
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non-standard  items  such  as  capital  injection.  Capital  injection  into  troubled  financial 
institutions can stimulate the economy through money and credit creation rather than 
through the traditional Keynesian channel. The asymmetric effect of fiscal policy over a 
business cycle will be an important topic for future research.  
Another  issue  left  for  future  research  involves  the  long-term  implications  of  an 
expansionary  fiscal  policy.  Although  fiscal  responsibility  is  a  more  serious  issue  for 
OECD  economies,  there  are  growing  concerns  about  government  debt  in  some 
developing  Asian  economies  as  well.  A  simple  regression  analysis  of  OECD  data 
indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio eventually leads 
to  about  a  5  percentage  point  increase  in  the  fiscal  debt-to-GDP  ratio.  The  highly 
persistent nature of fiscal deficits and/or fiscal debt point to the importance of controlling 
deficits and debt early on. For Asian economies, the implementation of fiscal rules, such 
as automatic stabilizers, may be desirable in order to both curb discretionary increases 
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Table 1-1: Recovery from Economic Downturns, Organisation  
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
 
Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 
GDP recession       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
1   1.44  1.00  1.00 
Growth during the 
first year of recovery
2   2.92  2.51  1.99 
All-time average growth  3.33  3.24  2.53 
Credit contraction       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
3   5.17  3.00  5.86 
Growth during the  
first year of recovery
2  9.20  6.01  13.28 
All-time average growth  1.64  1.30  11.50 
Stock price decline       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
3   19.83  6.00  30.30 
Growth during the  
first year of recovery
2  20.01  18.44  16.21 
All-time average growth  0.68  0.87  8.92 
Table 1-2: Recovery from Economic Downturns, Asia 
  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 
GDP recession       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
1   2.30  1.00  3.27 
Growth during the  
first year of recovery
2  5.25  4.00  3.64 
All-time average growth  5.49  5.80  4.87 
Credit contraction       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
3   5.69  3.00  8.45 
Growth during the 
first year of recovery
2   17.91  11.93  32.08 
All-time average growth  8.48  8.69  17.89 
Stock price decline       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
3   14.52  6.00  22.11 
Growth during the 
first year of recovery
2   31.60  26.41  28.47 
All-time average growth  2.72  0.68  33.58 
 
Note:  
All-time average growth refers to the average growth rate over the entire sample period. 
1Number of years. 
2Percent 
increase. 
3Number of quarters. 
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Table 2-1: Policy Responses, OECD 
  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 



















Credit contraction       
Fiscal policy















Stock price decline       
Fiscal policy
1  0.16  0.26












Table 2-2: Policy Responses, Asia 
  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 















Credit contraction       
Fiscal policy
1  -4.46















Stock price decline       
Fiscal policy













* and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical 
adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 as controlling variables. Monetary policy 2 is 
based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses only inflation and dummy_85 as controlling variables. 
1Percent changes from peak to trough. 
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Table 3: Interest Rate Changes During GDP Recessions and Credit 
Contractions 








































# of obs.  2843  2843  1501  1497 
 
Note:  
The dependent variable is the change in the cyclically-adjusted call interest rate. Estimation is by ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  
t-ratios are in parentheses.  




Table 4: GDP Growth During the First Year of Recovery 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






























Fiscal policy of Japan    0.001 
(0.00)    0.26 
(1.02) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    -0.14 
(-0.71)    -0.31
* 
(-1.70) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.15 
(1.03)    0.30
* 
(1.93) 






Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  73  73  73  73 
 
Note:  
The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate during the first year after a trough. Panel estimation with fixed effects.      
t-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively.
 Monetary policy 1 
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Table 5: Probability of Exiting a Recession 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
































Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.10 
(-1.29)    0.16 
(1.30) 
Fiscal policy of Germany     0.17
** 
(2.06)    0.01 
(0.08) 
Fiscal policy of US    -0.11 
(-1.47)    0.04 
(0.45) 






Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  73  73  73  73 
 
Note:  
The probability density of recovery is assumed to follow a Weibull distributioin. z-ratios are in parentheses. Monetary 
policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 as controlling 
variables. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Probability of a Recurring Recession 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
































Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.08 
(-0.53)    -0.11 
(-0.62) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    -0.34
** 
(-2.37)    -0.38
** 
(-2.21) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.21
* 
(1.90)    0.26
* 
(1.91) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  73  73  73  73 
 
Note: 
Probit estimation of the probability of a recurring recession. The recurrence is defined as another recession that occurs 
within 5 years. z-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. 
Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 
as controlling variables. 
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GDP Growth  
During the First Year of 
Recovery 
(2) 
















































# of obs.  19  19  19 
 
Note: 
Numbers within parentheses are t-ratios for column (1) and z-ratios for columns (2) and (3). * and ** denote significance at 
the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that 
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Table 8-1: Credit Growth During the First Year of Recovery, OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 































Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.07 
(-0.41)    -0.18 
(-1.04) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    -0.22 
(-0.66)    -0.32 
(-0.97) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.65  
(1.25)    0.53  
(0.99) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  69  69  68  68 
 
Table 8-2: Credit Growth During the First Year of Recovery, Asia 
  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 


























Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.34 
(-0.11)    -0.10 
(-0.20) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    -0.24 
(-0.18)    -1.31 
(-0.92) 
Fiscal policy of US    -1.22  
(-0.55)    2.47  
(1.43) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  47  47  47  47 
 
Note:  
The dependent variable is the credit growth rate during the first year after a trough. Panel estimation with fixed effects.     
t-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively.
 Monetary policy 1 
is  based  on  the  cyclical  adjustment  of  the  interest  rate  that  uses  GDP  gap,  inflation,  and  dummy_85  as  controlling 
variables. 
  
Crises in Asia: Recovery and Policy Responses  |       27 
 
 
Table 9-1: Probability of Exiting a Credit Contraction, OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




























Fiscal policy of Japan    0.03 
(0.88)    0.02 
(0.56) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.03 
(0.39)    -0.02 
(-0.22) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.22
* 
(1.77)    0.24
* 
(1.82) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  66  66  65  65 
 
Table 9-2: Probability of Exiting a Credit Contraction, Asia 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





























Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.03 
(-0.74)    -0.04 
(-0.99) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.04 
(0.31)    -0.03 
(-0.17) 
Fiscal policy of US    -0.26
*  
(-1.65)    -0.09  
(-0.44) 






Monetary policy1 of 












The probability density of recovery is assumed to follow a Weibull distributioin. z-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote 
significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the 
interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 as controlling variables. 
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Table 10-1: Probability of a Recurring Credit Contraction, OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





























Fiscal policy of Japan    0.03 
(0.82)    0.03 
(0.73) 
Fiscal policy of Germany     0.03 
(0.41)    0.07 
(0.80) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.04 
(0.34)    -0.11 
(-0.75) 




Monetary policy1 of 










# of obs.  70  70  69  69 
 
Table 10-2: Probability of a Recurring Credit Contraction, Asia 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























Fiscal policy of Japan    0.04 
(0.82)    0.05 
(0.82) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    -0.14 
(-0.90)    -0.07 
(-0.39) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.16  
(1.01)    0.01  
(0.04) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  48  48  48  48 
 
Note: 
Probit estimation of the probability of a recurring credit contraction. The recurrence is defined as another contraction that 
occurs  within  5 years.  z-ratios  are  in  parentheses.  *  and  **  denote  significance  at  the  10%  level  and  the  5%  level, 
respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and 
dummy_85 as controlling variables.  
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Table 11-1: Stock Price Growth During the First Year of Recovery, OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























Fiscal policy of Japan    0.29 
(0.47)    -0.13 
(-0.21) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.41 
(0.42)    -0.85 
(-0.83) 
Fiscal policy of US    -0.29 
(-0.33)    -0.24 
(-0.21) 






Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  122  122  122  122 
 
Table 11-2: Stock Price Growth During the First Year of Recovery, Asia 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


























Fiscal policy of Japan    -2.42 
(-1.44)    -0.02 
(-1.19) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.06 
(0.02)    0.004 
(0.11) 
Fiscal policy of US    3.60 
(1.15)    0.03  
(0.88) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  56  56  56  56 
 
Note: 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of stock prices during the first year after a trough. Panel estimation with fixed 
effects. t-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively.
 Monetary 
policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 as controlling 
variables.  
30          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 48 
 
 
Table 12-1: Probability of Exiting a Stock Price Decline, OECD 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 



























Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.06
* 
(-1.84)    -0.07 
(-1.98)
** 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.003 
(0.06)    -0.04 
(-0.71) 
Fiscal policy of US    -0.07 
(-1.17)    -0.07 
(-1.09) 




Monetary policy1 of 










# of obs.  119  119  119  119 
 
Table 12-2: Probability of Exiting a Stock Price Decline, Asia 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




























Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.006 
(-0.10)    0.08 
(0.95) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.04 
(0.27)    -0.67 
(-0.04) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.30
* 
(1.92)    0.38
**  
(2.15) 






Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  49  49  49  49 
 
Note:  
The probability density of recovery is assumed to follow a Weibull distributioin. z-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote 
significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the 
interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 as controlling variables. 
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Table 13-1: Probability of a Recurring Stock Price Decline, OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


























Fiscal policy of Japan    -0.0004 
(-0.01)    0.02 
(0.39) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    -0.11 
(-1.51)    -0.14 
(-1.59) 
Fiscal policy of US    -0.005 
(-0.05)    -0.02 
(-0.17) 




Monetary policy1 of 










# of obs.  122  122  122  122 
 
Table 13-2: Probability of a Recurring Stock Price Decline, Asia 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




























Fiscal policy of Japan    0.04 
(0.37)    0.002 
(0.01) 
Fiscal policy of Germany    0.05 
(0.29)    0.02 
(0.10) 
Fiscal policy of US    0.007 
(0.03)    0.07 
(0.31) 




Monetary policy1 of 








# of obs.  57  57  57  57 
 
Note: 
Probit estimation of the probability of a recurring stock price decline. The recurrence is defined as another stock price 
decline that occurs within 5 years. z-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% 
level, respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, 
and dummy_85 as controlling variables.  
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Table 14: Fiscal Balance of Central Government 
 
   2000–2008 Average  2009
6  2010
7 
  (% of GDP) 
       
Cambodia
1  -3.0  -3.2  — 
China, People's Rep. of
1  -0.8  -3.1  — 
Hong Kong, China
4  2.0  -3.9  — 
India
4  -3.6  -6.0  -6.8 
Indonesia  -0.7  -2.6  -1.6 
Korea, Rep. of
5  1.4  -2.1  -0.4 
Malaysia
2  -4.0  -7.4  -5.6 
Philippines  -1.8  -3.2  -2.8 
Singapore
1,4  9.3  -3.5  — 
Taipei,China
1  -1.1  -4.0  -4.2 
Thailand
4  -0.3  -4.0  -3.5 
Viet Nam
3  -4.7  -7.0  -6.2 
Average  -0.6  -4.2  -3.9 
       
 
Notes: 
— = not available. 
1 Refers to general government balance.          
2 Refers to federal government balance.        
3 Refers to state budget balance.           
4 Fiscal year.                
5 Consolidated budget balance.           
6 2009 estimates except for Cambodia (International Monetary Fund projection); People's Republic of China, Indonesia, 
and Thailand (Asian Development Outlook Update 2009); and Hong Kong, China (June 2009 projection).     
7 Estimates and government targets. 
 
Source: National sources, Asian Development Outlook (various issues), IMF Article IV reports, and CEIC.   
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Table 15: Policy Rate and Lending Rate Reductions During Crises 
 
  1997/98 Crisis  2008/09 Global Crisis 
  Policy Rate  Lending Rate  Policy Rate  Lending Rate 
  Amp  Dur  Sl  Amp  Dur  Sl  Amp  Dur  Sl  Amp  Dur  Sl 
                         
China, P.R. of
*  -  -  -  -  -  -  189  3  63  216  4  54 
Hong Kong, 
China  75  3  25  175  8  22  325  9  36  250  7  36 
India  400  26  15  250  12  21  425  7  61  238  9  26 
Indonesia  5779  14  413  1807  27  67  300  9  33  93  7  13 
Korea, Rep. of  2085  16  130  895  22  41  325  5  65  239  6  40 
Malaysia  807  14  58  579  19  30  150  4  38  99  10  10 
Philippines  2087  3  696  752  10  75  200  8  25  318  7  45 
Taipei,China  75  6  13  54  6  9  238  6  40  183  9  20 
Thailand  1794  9  199  700  15  47  250  5  50  140  6  23 
Viet Nam
*  -  -  -  -  -  -  700  5  140  1110  8  139 
Average  1638  11  194  652  15  39  310  6  55  289  7  41 
                         
 
Notes: 
"Amp" refers to amplitude is in basis points. "Dur" refers to duration in months. "Sl" refers to slope, that is, amplitude 
divided by duration. Amplitude is calculated based on the Harding and Pagan methodology whereby the peak interest rate 
level refers to the highest level of interest rate or the last peak during the crisis periods and the trough is the first trough as 
interest rates are eased.  
* Interest rate cycles of PRC and Viet Nam during the 1997/98 crisis exhibited no discernible peak and trough. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Bloomberg, CEIC, Datastream, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
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Figure 3: Probability to Remain in a Recession  
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Notes: Emerging Asia refers to ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand), NIEs-4 
(Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China) plus India. People's Republic 
of  China  (PRC)  is  not  included  because  it  does  not  have  the  same  quarterly  component 
breakdowns.  
Source: Authors' calculations based on CEIC data.  
 
Figure 5: Contributions to GDP Growth by Region and Country 



















  Notes:  PRC=People's  Rep  of  China;  HKG=Hong  Kong,  China;  INO=Indonesia;  IND=India; 
KOR=Republic of Korea; MAL=Malaysia; PHI=Philippines; SIN=Singapore; TAP=Taipei,China; and 
THA=Thailand.  
1 Refers to ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) plus NIEs-4 (Hong Kong, 
China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China) plus India. 
2  For  PRC,  Total  Consumption  (Public  plus  Private  Consumption)  is  used  as  no  breakdown  is 
available. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on CEIC data.  
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on CEIC data.  
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Figure 6: Fiscal Measures Announced and Delivered in 2009 
 











































                                           Source: Box 1.2, IMF (2009b).  
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Notes: NIEs-4 comprises Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China. 
Data  for  Hong  Kong,  China  refer  to  authorized  institutions'  loans  and  advances;  Republic  of 
Korea, commercial and specialized bank loans; Singapore, domestic banking institutions' loans 
and advances; and Taipei,China, domestic bank loans and advances. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from CEIC and central bank websites. 
 





















Notes: Data for Indonesia refer to commercial bank loans; Malaysia, commercial bank loans and 
advances; Philippines, commercial and universal bank loan portfolio; and Thailand, commercial 
bank loans. 
                Source: Authors' calculations based on data from CEIC and central bank websites. 
 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  data  from  CEIC  and  central  bank 
websites. 
  





























































Notes: PRC=People's Rep of China; HKG=Hong Kong, China; INO=Indonesia; IND=India; KOR=Republic 
of Korea; MAL=Malaysia; PHI=Philippines; SIN=Singapore; TAP=Taipei,China; and THA=Thailand. Real 
policy rate is calculated as end-October nominal policy rate minus the latest available consumer price 
inflation rate. Exchange rate changes are percentage changes vis-à-vis the US dollar between the two 
periods. 
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